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unemployment rates. Results show that a person's likelihood of leaving the DEP is 
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Each year, military recruiters face a typically 
difficult challenge of finding the required quantity and 
quality of volunteers to join the armed forces. When the 
nation's economy flourishes and unemployment declines, as 
in the late 1990s, a recruiter's job becomes even more 
challenging. 
Since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force during 
the 1970s, the services have used the Delayed Entry Program 
(DEP) to assist them in their recruiting mission. The DEP 
allows individuals to contract for enlistment up to one 
year prior to starting basic training. This policy allows 
high school seniors to enlist prior to graduation and 
smoothes the flow of new recruits into basic and advanced 
training facilities. 
The DEP is only a small portion of the recruiting 
process, which culminates when an individual begins his or 
her first day of active duty. This section provides the 
reader with a basic understanding of several important 
components of the recruiting process and some of its 
problem areas, such as recruit attrition. Recruit 
I 
attrition from the DEP forms the primary focus of the 
study, and it is described within the context of the 
recruiting process, as managed by the four military 
services. 
B. DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM (DEP} ATTRITION 
Persons who enter the DEP but do not make it to basic 
training are considered "DEP attrites." Between fiscal 
years 1991 and 1996, over 1.1 million individuals joined 
the DEP, yet 167,134 (15 percent) never entered basic 
training. Table 1.1 shows the total number of persons who 
joined the DEP during this period and their subsequent 
status (entered the military or dropped out of DEP} by 
gender and military service. Some individuals decide to 
renege on their contracts and leave the DEP. When 
individuals sign a contract to enlist, they are legally 
bound to fulfill this contract. However, this commitment 
is not enforced. In fact, the Navy's recruiting leadership 
manual specifically states: 
Under no circumstances will threats be used to get a 
DEP to ship. Do not force the contract down the DEP 
Recruit's throat. This will only make the DEP Recruit 
run faster. (CO:MNAVCRUITCOMINST 1133.6B) 
Not all DEP attrition is voluntary. Some persons are 
forced to leave the DEP for medical reasons or for 
2 
Table 1.1 Number of Delayed Entry Program 
(DEP) Participants by Status, Gender and Military Service, Fiscal Years 
1991-1996 
Gender and Army Navy Marine Air DoD 
DEP Status* Corps Force 
Men 
DEP Drops 38,033 37,055 35,470 14,911 125,063 
Entered Active Duty 263.817 239.474 158.352 125.755 787.804 
Total: DEP Accessions 301,850 276,529 193,822 140,666 912,867 
Women 
All 
DEP Drops 14,883 11,809 3,860 9,142 39,674 
Entered Active Duty 58.431 41,385 9.544 38,971 148,351 
Total: DEP Accessions 73,314 53,194 13,404 48, 113 188,025 
DEP Drops 52,898 47,810 39,373 23,975 167,134 
Entered Active Duty 322.266 281.913 167.853 164.804 933.758 
Total: DEP Accessions *375,164 329,723 207,226 188,779 1,100,892 
Source: Derived from a special database provided by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center. 
*Note: DEP accessions include all persons who entered the program between 
October 1991 and June 1996. Status (entered active duty or dropped out) is 
determined as of July 1998. 
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misconduct. Overall, the Department of Defense experiences 
a rate of DEP attrition annually between 14.1 and 16.6 
percent. 
As seen in Table 1.2, DEP attrition rates for men are 
highest in the Marine Corps, at 18.3 percent. At the same 
time, the Marine Corps has the highest DEP attrition rate 
for women at 28.8 percent. The lowest DEP attrition rates 
of the four services are found in the Air Force: 10.6 
percent for men and 19.0 percent for women. 
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Table 1.2 Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Attrition Rates (Percent), 
by Gender and Military Service, Fiscal Years 1991-1996 
Gender and Army Navy Marine Air DoD 
Fiscal Year Cor~s Force 
Men 
1991 10.8 12.9 19.3 11.2 13.1 
1992 10.3 16.7 17.0 9.6 13.6 
1993 12.1 13.2 17.4 12.4 13.6 
1994 13.3 11.6 18.5 11.0 13.7 
1995 15.6 13.1 19.0 10.3 14.9 
1996 14.5 11.5 18.5 8.3 13.6 
Total 12.6 13.4 18.3 10.6 13.7 
Women 
1991 15.8 24.0 27.3 21.1 20.3 
1992 17.1 17.7 24.9 17.5 17.9 
1993 19.7 20.8 29.7 20.5 20.9 
1994 21.1 19.8 30.0 20.4 21.1 
1995 23.9 25.9 30.4 18.5 23.7 
1996 22.9 26.0 29.7 16.1 22.4 
Total 20.3 22.1 28.8 19.0 21.1 
All 
1991 11.8 13.9 19.8 13.4 14.1 
1992 11.6 15.8 17.4 11.4 14.3 
1993 13.4 14.4 18.2 14.4 14.8 
1994 14.8 13.4 19.2 13.5 15.1 
1995 17.5 16.0 19.8 12.5 16.6 
1996 16.5 14.0 19.4 10.6 15.4 
Total 14.1 14.5 19.0 12.7 15.2 
Source: Derived from a special database provided by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center. 
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C. OTHER TYPES OF ATTRITION 
First-term attrition is defined as the failure of a new 
recruit to complete his or her first term of enlistment. 
Levels of first-term attrition have remained fairly 
constant over recent years at around 33 percent of each 
recruit cohort (all recruits who enter active duty during a 
given year) . About one-third of first-term attrition among 
a cohort is due to people who leave during the first 6 
months of active service. Early attrition has varied 
between 10 and 14 percent in recent years. (GAO/NSIAD-97-
39) By comparison, DEP attrition has varied between 14.1 
and 16.6 percent between 1990-1996. 
D. THE RECRUITING PROCESS 
(Table 1.2) 
Together, the armed services employ approximately 
12,000 recruiters who are located at 5,500 recruiting 
stations. These recruiting stations process entrants at 
one of the 65 Military Entrance Processing Stations 
(MEPSs). Each service trains its recruiters at different 
schools. The Air Force is the only service in which 
recruiters are assigned to the job on a completely 
voluntary basis. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have a 
combination of selection teams and screening processes to 
choose their new recruiters. (GAO/NSIAD-98-58) 
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The recruiting process can begin with a referral, 
potential lead, phone call, or a simply an interested 
"walk-in." Once an individual makes the decision to join 
the military, a recruiter leads him or her through the 
application process. The enlistment process formally 
begins when the individual takes the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). This battery of tests 
is used to determine basic eligibility to enlist, through 
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), as well 
eligibility for assignment to training in one of the 
military's many occupational areas. 
The next step in the application process occurs at a 
MEPS, where applicants provide a medical history and 
undergo medical examinations by physicians. Another 
physical exam occurs just prior to basic training. 
Persons who fall outside the prescribed medical standards 
may be completely disqualified for military service or may 
be required to obtain a medical waiver from the appropriate 
level of command. This level varies depending on the 
reason for the waiver. Similarly, admission of drug use, a 
self-disclosed history of legal problems, or a record of 
misconduct may require a moral waiver. Moral waiver 
categories include felony, non-minor misdemeanor, pre-
7 
service drug use, and minor traffic violations. Waivers 
for non-minor misdemeanors and pre-service drug use 
constituted nearly 75 percent of all waivers granted during 
fiscal years 1990-1997. (GAO/NSAID-99-53) 
The DEP entrance process culminates when the 
individual is sworn into the Individual Ready Reserve 
(IRR), formally taking an oath of allegiance, and signing a 
contract. Officially, these individuals are now obligated 
to serve in the military. As previously noted, however, 
the services generally do not enforce this requirement. 
Persons enrolled in the DEP remain in an unpaid status 
while waiting for basic training to begin. 
The final step in the enlistment process occurs just 
prior to basic training. Individuals must return to the 
MEPS, pass another medical exam, sign a second enlistment 
contract, and take another enlistment oath as an active 
duty service member. From the MEPS, individuals proceed to 
their respective basic training facility. 
The Navy trains all of its recruits for nine weeks at 
one location, the Naval Training Center in Great Lakes, 
Illinois. Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas is 
home for Air Force basic training. Air Force basic 
training is the shortest of all services, at only six 
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weeks. Army basic training lasts 8 weeks at bases in 
Missouri, South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and 
Alabama. The Army, Navy, and Air Force train their male 
and female recruits together. The Marine Corps segregates 
men and women during basic training. All women Marines 
train for 11 weeks in Parris Island, South Carolina. Male 
Marines train for 12 weeks in Parris Island or San Diego, 
California. (GAO/NSAID-98-58) 
Upon graduation from basic training, individuals 
generally proceed to training for a military occupation, 
unless designated for general assignment or other duty. 
All Marines, however, must train for three additional weeks 
at Marine Combat Training in either California or North 
Carolina prior to embarking on their specific occupational 
job training. 
Not all individuals successfully complete basic 
training. The services reward recruiters differently in 
this area. The Navy and Marine Corps offer performance 
awards to recruiters based upon the number of persons 
recruited who successfully complete basic training. The 
Army and Air Force, which access more than 55 percent of 
all new recruits annually, reward recruiters for the number 
of DEP entrants or persons who report to basic training. 
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The Army and Air Force "believe that a recruiter should not 
be penalized for a recruit's failure to complete basic 
training." (GAO/NSAID-98-58) As noted in a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) study of Military Attrition: 
Basic training officials from all services told [GAO] 
that recruiters do not have adequate incentives to 
ensure that their recruits are qualified medically, 
morally, and psychologically. That is, these 
officials believe that recruiters are driven by their 
monthly goals to recruit persons who may not be fully 
qualified and that recruiters do not have incentive to 
thoroughly probe applicants to learn of possibly 
disqualifying medical, psychological, or criminal 
problems. (GAO/NSAID-97-39) 
In 1998, GAO recommended to the Secretary of Defense 
that recruiter awards be more closely tied to recruits' 
successful completion of basic training. (GAO/NSAID-98-58) 
Manpower policy makers use performance incentives to 
achieve personnel goals and manage the force. Although 
the services currently employ varying policies in this 
area, they all have the same mission--to make recruiting 
goal. 
E. DEP MANAGEMENT 
Just as recruiter incentive policies vary, DEP 
management programs also vary among the services. The Navy 
has specific guidelines regarding contact requirements 
between recruiters and DEP participants. Navy recruiters 
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must contact all members of the DEP at least five times 
monthly. Three of these contacts can be by phone, one must 
be face-to-face, and another must be a monthly DEP meeting. 
Additionally, the Navy prohibits certain DEP functions, 
such as picnics and parties. The Navy has added a 
Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) program to its DEP. 
The DEP PQS system parallels its active-duty PQS system. 
DEP participants have an actual lesson plan of required 
knowledge. This knowledge is tested regularly by 
recruiters. Within the DEP, participants are assigned 
duties to manage their own program. Recruiters maintain 
overall responsibility for the program. 
(CO:MNAVCRUITCONINST 1133.6b) 
The Marine Corps approaches its DEP management much 
differently than that of the Navy. The Marine Corps has 
established guidelines, but allows recruiters some freedom 
to operate within those guidelines. Sergeants Major manage 
the Marine Corps DEP programs, which require weekly contact 
and monthly DEP meetings. Marine Corps recruiters are 
encouraged to be creative with their DEP activities. 
(MCRCO 1133.1) 
The Army has similar requirements for its DEP program. 
Army Recruiters must have an initial meeting with all new 
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DEP participants within 3 to 10 days after enlistment. 
Additionally, Army recruiters must contact DEP participants 
every two weeks, and meet face-to-face at least monthly. 
As in the Navy, the Army's requirements are very specific. 
Contact frequency between recruiter and DEP enrollee 
increases to weekly at 45 days prior to enlistment, 
alternating between face-to-face and phone contact. 
(USAREC Regulation 601-95) 
From day one in the DEP, Air Force recruiters refer 
to all DEP participants as "airmen." This provides a sense 
of belonging to a team as well as establishes a 
supervisor/subordinate relationship. Within 72 hours of 
entering the DEP, airmen must sign an informal contract 
acknowledging their responsibilities in the DEP. Prior to 
entering active duty, airmen are encouraged to find at 
least one qualified referral to join the DEP. As in the 
Navy, recruits in the Air Force DEP are assigned certain 
leadership billets and responsibilities. Individuals are 
"sworn in" and given a "change of command" when assuming 
DEP billets. This formality shows the importance of the 
position and teaches military customs. The Air Force 
refers to DEP drops as "cancellations." The DEP Management 
Guide highlights specific DEP behaviors that may indicate a 
12 
possible cancellation, such as missing monthly DEP 
meetings. Each phone call, face-to-face meeting, and DEP 
meeting is intended to "motivate, re-qualify, and 
perpetuate." Every 30 days while in the DEP, Airmen must 
complete a questionnaire indicating any changes in 
dependence, health, or moral status (such as police 
involvement or traffic tickets). 
Guide, 1998) 
F. DEP PURPOSE 
(USAF DEP Management 
Despite the services' DEP management differences, they 
share the same DEP purposes. First, the DEP provides a 
pool of applicants to fill future months' shipping goals. 
In fact, the Marine Corps refers to the DEP as the 
"National Pool Program," and members of the DEP are 
referred to as "poolees." Each service specifies various 
percentages of the DEP for future months. The Marine Corps 
requires that at least 25 percent of its recruiting mission 
come from DEP referral sources. (MCRCO 1133.1) For 
example, if a station's monthly mission requires 8 new 
recruits, at least 2 of those individuals should be from 
poolee referrals. Referrals can earn "poolees" points 
toward promotion after they enter active duty. 
The DEP also helps prepare individuals for boot camp, 
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both physically and mentally. At a minimum, each 
recruiting station holds DEP meetings monthly. The Navy 
requires physical activity at each meeting. 
(COMNAVCRUITCOMINSTR 1133.6B) The Marine Corps highly 
encourages physical activity, but it is not required. The 
Marine Corps is the only service that requires a physical 
fitness test (PFT) within 30 days of joining the DEP and 
again before the individual is shipped to boot camp. 
Some services use the DEP as a method of smoothing the 
flow of new trainees into the training infrastructure. DEP 
attrition can cause serious problems for the recruiting 
districts and training pipelines. Vacant seats in schools 
cost money, regardless if anyone attends training. The 
Marine Corps does not tie its accessions to school seats. 
Marine Corps enlistment codes allow for flexibility in 
assignments to handle fluctuations in accession numbers. 
G. COST ESTIMATES 
It is difficult to actually estimate the cost of DEP 
attrition. Some view DEP attrition as a natural selection 
process, eliminating individuals who would likely be 
discharged prematurely from active duty. Indeed, perhaps 
individuals who drop out of the DEP would have dropped out 
during boot camp, when the costs of replacing the recruit 
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are higher. It is possible to estimate a monetary value of 
attrition based on the administration and manpower 
associated with recruitment and training. A recent GAO 
report calculates that, in fiscal year 1996, DoD spent 
about "$290 million in fixed and variable costs to recruit 
and train individuals who never made it to their first duty 
stations." (GAO/NSAID-97-39) The average cost to recruit 
and train an individual is approximately $12,000 (in 1997). 
Additionally, initial skills training can cost $6,000 to 
$16,000. Overall, GAO estimates that reducing 6-month 
attrition from active duty by 4-percent would generate a 
$4.8 million savings. 
H. ATTRI:TI:ON GOALS 
(GAO/NSAID-97-39) 
The Army, Navy, and Air Force have recently set goals 
to reduce all types of unscheduled personnel attrition. 
The Marine Corps was the only service that did not set a 
goal to reduce attrition at any level. The Army's goal is 
to reduce early attrition by 4 percent. (GAO/NSIAD-97-39) 
Additionally, the Army strives to limit DEP attrition to 10 
percent of gross contracts. Once an individual expresses a 
desire to leave the DEP, Army recruiters are instructed to 
"sell" the individual on the Army Reserves. (USAREC 
Regulation 601-95) The Marine Corps has been the most 
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successful service in this respect: of those who leave the 
Marine Corps DEP, 11.2 percent enlist in the Reserve or 
transfer to the Inactive Ready Reserve. (See Table 3.3 in 
Chapter III.) Although the Marine Corps has yet to set a 
limit or goal regarding DEP attrition, it does recognize 
that such attrition adversely affects its ability to meet 
its recruiting mission. As a part of its DEP management, 
Marine Corps recruiters are tasked to perform a "risk 
assessment" of DEP participants. Any individual identified 
as being likely to leave the DEP (based on a historical 
profile) is thus given additional attention. (MCRCO 
1133.1) 
:r: • THESJ:S PURPOSE 
This thesis examines the effects of personal background 
characteristics and local area economic conditions on an 
individual's likelihood to leave the DEP. DEP attrition 
behavior is studied over time, specifically fiscal years 
1991 through 1996, and across all four military services. 
Further, behavioral differences are analyzed based upon 
gender and moral waiver status. The principal method of 
analysis is a binary logit model to estimate the likelihood 
that an individual will attrite from the DEP. 
Chapter II of the thesis presents a literature review, 
16 
which summarizes findings from previous DEP attrition 
research. Chapter III discusses the data and research 
methodologies used in the study. Chapter IV outlines the 
multivariate model estimation. Chapter V provides logit 
model results. Finally, Chapter VI presents conclusions of 
the study and several recommendations. 
17 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM (DEP) ATTRITION RESEARCH 
Since its inception in the early 1960s, many studies 
regarding the DEP have been published. Few studies, 
however, have compared DEP loss behavior among the four 
services. Most research in this area has used binary legit 
models to examine behavior within an individual service. 
In 1985, Philip and Schmitz used legit models with a 
micro-data set to forecast DEP attrition in the U. S. Army. 
(Philip and Schmitz, 1985) Their data set contained all 
Army DEP participants from the first half of fiscal years 
1982 and 1983. They analyzed one model for high school 
seniors and a second model for high school graduates and 
non-high school graduates combined. In both models, they 
found that a one-month increase in DEP length resulted in a 
2.7 percent increase in Army DEP attrition. They also 
found that female and younger recruits were less likely to 
become DEP losses. Persons scoring higher on the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) were also less likely to 
become an Army DEP loss. 
In 1985, Murray studied Navy DEP attrition using legit 
models. (Murray, 1985) She tracked all non-prior service 
Males who entered the Navy DEP during fiscal years 1980 
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through 1983 for 12 months. She found that individuals who 
spent more than seven months in the DEP, were over 21 years 
of age, and had dropped out of high school were more likely 
to leave the DEP. Additionally, Murray found that persons 
with AFQT scores above the 65th percentile were more likely 
to attrite. Theoretically, persons with higher AFQT scores 
may obtain more competitive job offers while in the DEP. 
In 1986, Quester and Murray studied Navy DEP attrition 
using micro-level data containing all recruit cohorts from 
fiscal years 1983 through 1984. (Quester and Murray, 1986) 
The authors found "DEP attrition elasticity with respect to 
time-in-DEP of 1.2." That is, a 10-percent increase in 
months contracted in the DEP increases a person's attrition 
probability by 12 percent. Quester and Murray also found 
that women and older recruits were more likely to attrite 
from the DEP; and that the effects of AFQT were 
inconclusive. One unique feature of this study was the 
inclusion of shipping month, or the point at which the DEP 
enrollee is schedule to enter active duty. The authors 
found that individuals scheduled to ship in May more likely 
to attrite than those scheduled to ship in other months. 
Most high school seniors plan to ship during May and June, 
upon graduation. The fact that high school seniors have a 
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relatively high DEP loss probability may explain this peak 
in DEP loss during the last spring or early summer months. 
In contrast, Quester and Murray found recruits scheduled to 
ship in October as least likely to leave the DEP. This may 
indicate that persons who enlist from the civilian 
workforce are more certain of their decision to join the 
military. 
Another interesting variable used by Quester and 
Murray was the ratio of number of recruits in the DEP per 
recruiter. As the ratio increases, the authors found that 
DEP attrition increased. Logically, this suggests that 
recruiters with a heavier DEP recruit load would have less 
time to spend preparing each recruit for boot camp. 
In 1990, Kearl and Nelson studied Army DEP attrition 
as it related to the military/civilian wage ratio and 
regional unemployment rates for fiscal years 1986 through 
1987. (Kearl and Nelson, 1990) The authors used three 
separate models: one for high school seniors, one for high 
school graduates, and one for non-high school graduates. 
Both the unemployment rate and the military/civilian wage 
ratio were found to have significant negative effects on 
DEP losses. Specifically, a 10-percent decrease in the 
civilian unemployment rate was associated with a 3-percent 
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increase in DEP attrition. Further, a 10-percent decrease 
in the military/civilian wage ratio indicated a 4.6-percent 
increase in DEP attrition. 
Using data from May 1987 through September 1991, 
Nakada identified factors that affect Navy DEP attrition 
and produced a model to forecast DEP attrition using 
binary legit models. (Nakada, 1994) Individual 
demographic factors have been specified in previous 
studies as significantly affecting the likelihood of DEP 
attrites. For example, as with Quester and Murray 
(1986), Nakada found a difference of 11 percentage points 
between the DEP attrition rates of men and women in the 
Navy. Women tended to leave the DEP at a rate of 25 
percent. At the same time, the DEP attrition rate for 
men held at about 13 percent. Further, individuals in 
AFQT categories I, II, and IIIA attrited at a 14.7 
percent rate; and those scoring in AFQT category IIB and 
IV attrited at a slightly higher rate of 16.0 percent. 
As time-in-DEP increased, Nakada (1994) found an 
increase in DEP attrition rates. The length of time spent 
in the DEP was a significant predictor of DEP attrition. 
Specifically, Nakada found that an increase of 30 days in 
the DEP would tend to increase DEP attrition rates 
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correspondingly by 1.4 percentage points. 
Nakada (1994) separated DEP enrollees by their 
education status, including high school graduates, high 
school seniors, and non-high school graduates. High school 
seniors were found to comprise a disproportionate number of 
DEP attrites, at 53.3 percent. The DEP attrition rate for 
high school diploma graduates was similar to that found in 
previous studies, at 11.9 percent. The DEP attrition rate 
for high school seniors was higher than in previous 
studies, at 20.6 percent. As expected, seniors are most 
affected by civilian unemployment trends. Since seniors 
are usually still exploring employment opportunities, they 
are most open to additional information. 
Nakada (1994) additionally found that older recruits 
were more likely to attrite than were their younger 
counterparts. He also found that whites had a greater 
propensity to attrite than did blacks. Further, Nakada 
found that the number of changes in shipping date was a 
significant predictor of DEP attrition. He argued that a 
change in shipping date could result in a loss of a first 
choice school seat. 
Another interesting finding by Nakada (1994) involved 
the seniority of recruiters. That is, recruits with more 
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senior recruiters (E-7 versus E-5 or E-6) were less likely 
to attrite from the DEP. Recruiters are not only salesmen 
for the Navy, they are also role models for young recruits. 
Black recruiters can be unsuccessful in predominately white 
areas and vice versa. Nakada tracked similarities in 
minority characteristics of recruiters and their recruits. 
Statistically, these variables proved to be insignificant 
predictors of DEP attrition. 
As expected, higher unemployment rates were found to 
reduce the number of DEP attrites. For example, "as the 
unemployment rate increases from 5.9-percent to 
6.9-percent, DEP attrition rates would decrease by 2 
percent." (Nakada, 1994) Nakada found that a recruit who 
lived farther away from a recruiting station was less 
likely to leave the DEP. The author surmised that 
applicants for enlistment from rural areas may have to seek 
out a recruiter, therefore demonstrating a stronger 
commitment to join the military than persons who have easy 
access to a recruiting station. 
Bohn and Schmitz (1996) studied Navy recruit training 
and DEP attrition using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression and binary logit models. Their data included a 
20 percent sample of fiscal years 1992 through 1993. Navy 
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accessions. The authors' models separated high school 
seniors from all others. They hypothesized that the 
behavior of these two groups was distinctly different. 
Their models indicated that individuals with higher AFQT 
scores are less likely to leave the DEP. They also found 
that Hispanics and older recruits more likely to attrite 
from the DEP. Among women, they found that longer DEP time 
corresponded with an increased likelihood of DEP attrition. 
In 1998, Knox used data from Commander, Naval 
Recruiting Command (CNRC) and the Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA) to analyze Navy DEP attrition behavior. (Knox, 1998) 
His data set included all individuals scheduled to report 
to recruit training command from October 1995 through 
December 1997. Knox found "individuals who accept 
incentives prior to enlistment and those individuals who 
change enlistment programs while in DEP have a 
significantly lower propensity to attrite from DEP than 
others." The author used a Classification and Regression 
Tree (CART) to analyze his logit results. According to 
Knox's CART model, an individual who had no high school 
diploma and a low AFQT score, who planned to spend 12 
months in the DEP, had only a 3-percent chance of actually 
shipping to boot camp. Knox also used a variable .unseen in 
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previous studies: whether the individual was a cigarette 
smoker. His model showed that cigarette smokers had a 
higher propensity to attrite from the DEP. 
In 1999, Henderson researched DEP attrition across 
services using logit models. (Henderson, 1999) Her 
research covered fiscal years 1990 through 1996 and used 
data sets from DMDC for all services, and from CNRC for 
Navy only. Henderson's research focused specifically on 
the behavior of high school seniors in the DEP. She found 
that older high school seniors were over 2 percentage 
points more likely to attrite from the DEP (5 percentage 
points for the Army) than were their younger counterparts. 
Henderson also found that the Marine Corps tended to have 
the highest percentage of high school seniors in the DEP as 
well as the highest percentage of senior DEP attrition. 
Further, she found that Black women tended to have the 
lowest DEP attrition rates. She attributed this to the 
relatively more limited opportunities for this group in the 
civilian labor market. 
B. SUMMARY OF FJ:NDJ:NGS 
Overall, researchers agree that personal 
characteristics (such as gender, race, and age) and 
economic variables (such as the local unemployment rate) 
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are the best predictors of DEP attrition behavior. (Nakada, 
1994; Philip and Schmitz, 1985; Margaret Mary Murray, 1985; 
Quester and Murray, 1986; Kearl and Nelson, 1990; Bohn and 
Schmitz, 1996; Knox, 1998; and Henderson, 1999) Many 
studies also agree that the behavior of high school seniors 
in the DEP differs from that of persons who enlist directly 
from the workforce. That is, high school seniors are more 
likely to attrite from the DEP. (Nelson and Kearl, 1990; 
Bohn and Schmitz, 1996; and Henderson, 1999) Studies 
disagree regarding the DEP attrition behavior of 
individuals based on their AFQT scores. For example, 
Murray (1985) found that persons with higher AFQT scores 
tended to have a higher propensity to attrite from the DEP. 
Philip and Schmitz' (1985), on the other hand, found that 
recruits with higher AFQT scores had a relatively lower 
likelihood of DEP attrition. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the findings of previous research 
on DEP attrition. Eight different studies are summarized 
in the table. As seen here, all studies used logit models 
to analyze attrition behavior. Five studies focused on the 
Navy, two looked at the Army, and just one used data on all 
four services. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of DEP Attrition Findings from Previous Research 
Study Year Data Method Findings* 
Philip & Schmitz 1985 Army LOGIT Models (+) DEP Length 
(FY82-83) (-)Female 
(+)Age 
(-) AFQT score 
Murray 1985 Navy LOGIT Models (+) >7 months in DEP 
(FY80-83) (+) >21 years old 
(+)High School Drop Out 
(+) >65th percentile AFQT score 




(-) October Shipper 
(+)#of recruits in DEP per recruiter 
Kearl & Nelson 1990 Army LOGIT Models (-)Regional Unemployment Rate 
(FY86-87) (-)Military/Civilian Wage Ratio 
Nakada 1994 Navy LOGIT Models (+)Female 
(FY87-91) (-) AFQT Score> 50 % 
(+) DEP Length 
(+)High School Senior 
(+)Age 
(+)White 
(-) More senior recruiter 
(-)Local Unemployment Rate 
(-)Distance from home to Recruiting Station 
Bohn & Schmitz 1996 Navy LOGIT Models (+) High School Senior 
20%of (-) AFQT Score 
(FY92-93) (+)Hispanic 
(+)Age 
(+) DEP Length 
(+)Female 
Knox 1998 Navy LOGIT Models (-)Enlistment incentive while in DEP 
( 1995-1997) (-)Change in enlistment program in DEP 
(+)Non-High School Diploma Grad 
(+) Low AFQT score 
(+) 12 months in DEP 
Henderson 1999 All Services/ LOGIT Models (+) > 18 years old 
High School (+)Female 
Seniors Only (-)Married 
(FY90-96) (+) AFQT score> 65 percentile 
(-)Regional Unemployment Rate 
(-) Black Female 
*Note: (+)Positive Effect on DEP Attrition;(-) Negative Effect on DEP Attrition 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DEP DATA FILES 
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Monterey, 
California developed a special database for this research. 
A raw data file on DEP attrition initially was compiled by 
DMDC at the request of the Directorate for Accession Policy 
in the Off ice of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel 
and Readiness). The data file contained 1.4 million 
observations and included all individuals, from all four 
services, who entered the DEP between October 1989 and June 
1996. "Quick shippers" were not included in this data set. 
(A "quick shipper" is an individual who is sent to boot 
camp within the first month of enlistment.) 
The Military Entrance Processing Cormnand (MEPCOM) file 
was the primary source file used in constructing the DMDC 
data set. Other sources included the DMDC Active Duty 
Master Loss Files, and the Defense Investigative Service 
Files. Disposition status codes for personnel were used to 
identify DEP attrites and were based on information from 
DMDC's Active Component Files. One of three possible 
status codes was assigned to each record: DEP drop, DEP 
drop who later entered active duty, or DEP participant who 
entered active duty. 
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If an individual record contained both a DEP drop date 
and an active duty accession date, it was classified as a 
DEP drop. The existence of such a contradictory record is 
likely due to data entry error. In cases where the DEP 
entry date or DEP discharge dates were missing, but 
evidence of an active duty accession was determined by 
DMDC, the record was also classified as a DEP drop. For 
the purpose of this study, individuals who initially 
dropped from the DEP are grouped together, regardless of 
whether they may have reentered the DEP later (and 
ultimately entered active duty.) 
The number of contract months in DEP was calculated by 
subtracting the DEP entry date from the projected date of 
entering active duty, as reported in the MEPCOM file. The 
number of actual months spent in DEP was calculated by 
subtracting the DEP entry date from the DEP discharge date. 
Particular note must be given to the disproportionate 
number of Air Force records with exactly 12 contract months 
in DEP. According to DMDC, the Air Force has indicated 
that this is a data reporting error. 
The DMDC raw data file was converted to a Statistical 
Analysis System (SAS) file and merged with local 
unemployment data provided by the Bureau of Labor 
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Statistics, Local Area Unemployment section. The Bureau 
provided unemployment rates, both monthly and annual, at 
the county level. The files were merged by county codes, 
using SAS programs. 
The final data file contains records for all 
individuals who signed an enlistment contract and entered 
the DEP during fiscal years 1990 through 1996. However, 
local unemployment data were only available for a portion 
of fiscal year 1990. Therefore, all analyses conducted in 
this thesis are confined to fiscal years 1991 through 1996. 
B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for selected 
variables from the data file. As seen here, Marine Corps 
recruits account for about 19 percent of the sample, 
compared with just under 17 percent for the Air Force. The 
largest proportions of new recruits in the sample are from 
the Army (34.3 percent) and the Navy (30.1 percent). Men 
account for approximately 83 percent of DEP entrants in the 
population. Nearly 70 percent of new DEP entrants are 
white and 17 percent are black. Although the vast majority 
of DEP entrants are high school graduates, high school 
seniors account for the next largest education-level group 
at 22.6 percent. Most individuals who entered the DEP 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for DEP Data File, Fiscal Years 1991-1996 





Marine Corps 18.7 





No Dependents 90.0 





Asian, Pacific Islander or Other 4.7 
AFQT Score 
High Quality 71.1 
Low Quality 28.9 
Waiver Status 
No Waiver 83.1 
Moral Waiver 10.9 
Other Waiver 6.0 
DEP Status 
Dropped from DEP 15.0 
Entered Active Duty 85.0 
DEP Entry Year 
Fiscal Year 1991 19.1 
Fiscal Year 1992 17.9 
Fiscal Year 1993 17.7 
Fiscal Year 1994 16.4 
Fiscal Year 1995 16.8 
Fiscal Year 1996 12.1 
Education Level 
High School Graduate 70.6 
High School Senior 22.6 
GED or Non-High School Graduate 6.8 
Other 
Age at DEP Entry (years) 19.2 
Time contracted to spend in DEP (months) 6.1 
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between 1991 and 1996 are considered "high quality" based 
upon their AFQT score (Category I-IIIA), and 83 percent 
entered the military with no waiver. On average, DEP 
entrants during the period were just over 19 years old and 
contracted to spend about 6 months in the DEP before 
shipping to boot camp. It should be noted that 15 percent 
of all persons in the DEP data file never made it to boot 
camp. 
C. METHODOLOGY: MULTIVARIATE LOGIT ANALYSIS 
In the multivariate estimation model, the dependent 
variable is binary indicating whether or not an individual 
drops out of the DEP prior to boot camp. This binary legit 
model uses maximum-likelihood techniques to predict an 
applicant's likelihood to attrite from the DEP. 
predicts probabilities between 0 and 1. 
The legit model is defined as: 
P(Yd = P[Yi = 1/XiJ = P = 1/ (l+e-Bx), 
The model 
where P(Yi) is the probability that individual i will become 
a DEP drop; B is the coefficient vector to be estimated 
and X is a vector of explanatory variables. 
SAS was used to perform the multivariate modeling. 
D. DATA TABULATIONS AND CROSS-TABULATIONS 
Between FY91 and FY96, 167,134 individuals dropped out 
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of the DEP prior to their scheduled date to enter recruit 
training (see Table·l.l). Table 3.2 breaks down DEP 
attrition rates by gender, education-level, and service. 
As seen in Table 3.2, 15.2 percent of the DEP population 
between 1991 and 1996 dropped out of the DEP program. 
Although women comprise a relatively small portion of the 
military (14.1 percent in 1999), they experience a much 
higher DEP attrition rate than do men, at 21.1 percent. 
Men attrite from DEP at a rate closer to the overall 
average, 13.7 percent. Across services, the Army loses the 
largest number of individuals; however, the Marine Corps 
loses the greatest percentage of its initial DEP entrants, 
about 20 percent overall. At the same time, Marine Corps 
women experience even higher DEP attrition rates, between 
27 and 30 percent. Air Force women display the lowest DEP 
attrition rates among servicewomen at 16 to 20 percent. 
Air Force men also exhibit the lowest DEP attrition rates 
of those in all four services, at 10 to 12 percent. 
Over recent fiscal years, DEP attrition rates have 
remained fairly constant, varying from 10 to 20 percent for 
men and from 15 to 30 percent for women. It should be 
noted however that slightly higher DEP attrition rates are 
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Table 3.2 Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Attrition Rates (Percent) by Gender, 
Education Level, and Military Service, Fiscal Years 1991-1996 
Gender and Education Level Army Navy Marine Air DoD 
Corps Force 
Men 
High School Senior 30.1 23.1 30.7 21.3 27.0 
Non-High School Diploma Graduate 14.3 14.5 22.5 15.2 15.6 
GED 13.1 11.1 15.6 13.3 12.8 
Some College 9.4 13.0 14.2 11.7 11.2 
High School Graduate 8.4 9.6 10.8 8.2 9.2 
All Education Levels 12.6 13.4 18.3 10.6 13.7 
Women 
High School Senior 47.4 36.8 47.6 36.8 41.3 
Non-High School Diploma Graduate 18.6 22.0 31.2 21.0 20.5 
GED 19.6 20.6 25.2 20.1 20.3 
Some College 16.1 19.4 20.0 17.9 17.4 
High School Graduate 15.6 17.4 19.0 15.5 16.2 
All Education Levels 20.3 22.1 28.8 19.0 21.1 
All 
High School Senior 33.0 25.1 31.8 25.3 29.0 
Non-High School Diploma Graduate 15.1 15.5 23.0 16.6 16.4 
GED 13.7 11.9 15.9 14.9 13.5 
Some College 11.3 14.5 15.0 13.4 12.8 
High School Graduate 9.9 10.9 11.4 10.0 10.4 
All Education Levels 14.1 14.5 19.0 12.7 15.2 
Source: Derived from a special database provided by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center. 
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observed for fiscal years 1994 (16.4 percent) and 1995 
(16.8 percent). High school seniors are especially prone 
to leave the DEP. In fact, high school seniors who are 
women experience DEP attrition at nearly 50 percent in the 
Army and in the Marine Corps. Male high school seniors 
leave the DEP at rates between 21 and 30 percent. Overall, 
Army high school seniors leave at the greatest rate, 33 
percent. Non-high school diploma graduates attrite from 
the DEP at a rate of about 15 percent, which is the average 
for overall DEP attrition. High school graduates 
experience the lowest DEP attrition rates, at 10.5 percent. 
Reasons for DEP attrition are displayed in Table 3.3. 
As seen here, reasons vary greatly across gender. The most 
common reason for DEP attrition for both men and women is 
"refused active service, apathy or personal problem." 
Between 31 and 55 percent of all individuals who attrite 
from the DEP fall into this category. Among women, medical 
and pregnancy reasons account for nearly 25 percent of DEP 
drops. Eleven percent of men drop from the DEP for moral 
reasons compared with only 3 percent for women. For men 
and women, the Marine Corps kept the greatest percentage of 
DEP drops in the military system. Eleven percent of men 
and nearly 5 percent of women dropped out of the DEP to 
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enlist in the Marine Corps Reserve or the IRR. High school 
seniors are ineligible to enlist if they fail to graduate 
from high school. Approximately 11 to 13 percent of all 
male DEP participants drop out of the DEP due to a failure 
to graduate from high school. Air Force men experience the 
lowest rate among all services, 3.3 percent, for failure to 
graduate from high school. This reason is much less 
prevalent for women. Between 2 and 6 percent of all female 
DEP participants drop out of the DEP due to a failure to 
graduate from high school. For men and women, between 2 to 
5 percent drop out of the DEP to pursue of higher 
education. 
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Table 3.3 Delayed Entry Program {DEP) Discharge Rates {Percent) by 
Gender, Reason, and Military Service, Fiscal Years 1991-1996 
Gender and Discharge Reason Army Navy Marine Air DoD 
Corps Force 
Men 
Apathy/Personal Problem/Refused to Enlist 41.2 38.0 31.9 42.9 37.9 
Medical 11.2 17.0 15.4 11.4 14.1 
Moral 10.1 15.0 13.5 12.8 12.8 
Failure to graduate from high school 11.6 13.4 13.8 3.3 11.8 
DAT positive results 14.1 0.1 0.0 3.5 "4.8 
Transfer to IRR, or 0.0 3.7 11.2 0.6 4.3 
Enlisted in Reserve 
Pursuit of higher education 4.2 3.0 3.7 1.9 3.4 
Did not report to active duty 3.3 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.7 
Exceeded time in DEP 1.4 1.3 0.9 2.1 1.3 
Dependency disqualification 0.2 0.6 0.2 1.7 0.5 
Enlisted in other service 0.1 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 
Recruiting error/Misunderstanding 0.1 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.5 
Death 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Personal hardship 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.4 
Disqualified for option/no alternative 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.4 
Other reason 1.3 3.0 4.6 14.1 4.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Women 
Apathy/Personal Problem/Refused to Enlist 54.4 44.8 40.8 50.3 49.3 
Medical 10.3 18.0 16.3 12.3 13.6 
Pregnancy 13.2 14.1 13.2 12.5 13.3 
Failure to graduate from high school 3.7 5.8 5.7 2.2 4.2 
Moral 2.9 3.6 3.5 4.2 3.5 
Pursuit of higher education 3.8 2.2 5.4 1.8 3.0 
Did not report to active duty 3.3 2.4 3.0 1.2 2.5 
Transfer to IRR, 0.0 3.6 4.7 0.4 1.6 
or Enlisted in same service reserve 
DAT positive results 3.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.6 
Exceeded Time in DEP 1.1 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.4 
Enlisted in other service 0.1 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Recruiting error/ Misunderstanding 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.4 
Disqualified for option/no alternative 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.4 
Death 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Other reason 1.7 1.2 3.9 8.9 3.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Derived from a special database provided by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center. 
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IV. MULTIVARIATE MODEL ESTIMATION 
A. MODELS 
Variations of the basic model (model 1) are used 
throughout this thesis. The models used in this thesis 
were numbered for easy reference. Table 4.1 describes each 
of the model specifications. 
Table 4.1 Description of Models 
Model Service Variables 
1 All Services without county unemployment rates 
2 All Services with county unemployment rates 
3 Army with county unemployment rates 
4 Navy with county unemployment rates 
5 Marine Corps with county unemployment rates 
6 Air Force with county unemployment rates 
A1 All Services high school seniors only 
A2 All Services non-high school seniors only 
A3 Army high school seniors only 
A4 Army non-high school seniors only 
A5 Navy high school seniors only 
A6 Navy non-high school seniors only 
A7 Marine Corps high school seniors only 
AB Marine Corps non-high school seniors only 
A9 Air Force high school seniors only 
A10 Air Force non-high school seniors onl~ 
Individuals with either prior DEP experience or prior 
service were deleted from the sample. Approximately ~ 
percent of· individuals were previously in the DEP and 1. 7 
percent were previously on active duty. The initial model 
included both groups, but due to high collinearity between 
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the prior service and prior DEP variables, such 
observations were deleted from the analysis data file. 
Since local unemployment data were only available for 
calendar years 1990-1998, DEP data for all of fiscal year 
1990 were deleted. 
B. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS 
A description of variables used in the multivariate 
models is displayed in Table 4.2. Models Al through AlO 
are located in the Appendix. Variables selected for use in 
the basic model (model 1) were chosen based upon prior 
research and data availability. 
The variables FEMALE and BLACK are binary, or dummy, 
variables indicating whether an individual is female or 
male, and black or non-black. The ethnic variable APIO 
indicates whether an individual is Asian, Pacific Islander, 
or other ethnicity. Women are expected to be more likely 
to attrite from the DEP. Traditionally, military service 
is predominately a male environment. Increased female DEP 
attrition could be attributed to a lack of female role 
models in the recruiting field. Pregnancy is also an 
additional, disqualifying status for female DEP 
participants. Blacks, Hispanics, and Asian, Pacific 





































Table 4.2 Description of Model Variables 
=1 if Army; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if Navy; =0 if otherwise 
Description 
=1 if Marine Corps; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if Air Force; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if female; =0 if male 
=1 if one or more dependents; =0 if no dependents 
=1 if Black; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if Hispanic; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if Asian, Pacific Islander or other; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if AFQT score is lllB or IV; 
=0 if AFQT score is Category I, II, or lllA 
=1 if granted Active Duty or DEP Moral Waiver; =0 if no waiver 
=1 if granted Active Duty or DEP waiver other than a moral 
waiver; =0 if no waiver 
=1 if dropped out of the DEP; 
=0 if shipped to basic training 
=1 if entered DEP in Fiscal Year 1991; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if entered DEP in Fiscal Year 1992; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if entered DEP in Fiscal Year 1993; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if entered DEP in Fiscal Year 1994; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if entered DEP in Fiscal Year 1995; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if entered DEP in Fiscal Year 1996; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if High School Graduate; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if High School Senior; =0 if otherwise 
=1 if GED certificate or non-high school graduate; 
=0 if otherwise 
Age at DEP Entry (years) 
Time contracted to spend in DEP (months) 
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DEP. In theory, minorities may have fewer employment or 
other opportunities outside the military. The variable 
DEPEND includes individuals who are married or unmarried 
with dependents at the time of DEP entry. Individuals with 
dependents may have a stronger desire for employment than 
those without such responsibilities. Therefore, persons 
with dependents are expected to be less likely to attrite 
from the DEP. 
The AGE_DEP variable indicates an individual's age (in 
years) at the time of DEP entry. The military will not 
accept applicants for enlistment who are older than 35 
years. The primary window of opportunity for enlistment is 
for persons who are ages 17 to 21 years old. Historically, 
older recruits may be less suited for military service due 
to physical abilities and trainability. Prior research 
shows that older recruits are more likely to attrite from 
both basic training and the DEP. (Quester and Murray, 
1986; Nakada, 1994; and Bohn and Schmitz, 1996) 
The MNS_DEP variable shows the number of months that 
an individual contracted to spend in the DEP. The longer a 
recruit intends to spend in the DEP, the increased chance 
that other opportunities of employment may occur. 
Therefore, it is expected that MNS_DEP will have a positive 
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effect on DEP attrition. 
Individuals were placed in one of three different 
education level categories: high school senior (HSSENIOR), 
high school graduate/some college (HSGRAD), and GED/non-
high school graduate (GED_NHSG) . Each of the three 
education level variables is measured as a binary variable. 
Prior research has proven that high school seniors are more 
likely to attrite from the DEP. High school seniors 
typically join the DEP for longer periods, thus finding 
more opportunities (theoretically) for employment. 
Additionally, individuals with GEDs and high school drop-
outs are also more likely to attrite from the DEP. Perhaps 
these individuals are prone to attrite from any occupation. 
Individuals scoring in AFQT category IIIB were placed 
in the low quality' category (LOWQUAL). High quality 
includes individuals scoring in AFQT category I, II, or 
IIIA. The military limits the number of enlistment 
opportunities for persons who score in the low quality 
category. Although these individuals may likewise have 
limited employment opportunities outside the military, they 
may be prone to other disqualifying factors, such as 
misconduct or failure to graduate from high school. 
For individuals who require either a DEP moral waiver 
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or an active duty moral waiver, MORALWVR equals 1. Moral 
waivers may be granted for traffic violations, felony 
convictions, drug or alcohol abuse, or misdemeanor 
offenses. Moral waivers are defined differently across 
services. For example, the Navy and the Air Force define a 
felony-type moral waiver as one or more felony-type 
offenses. The Marine Corps and the Army limit the number 
of allowable felony-type convictions to one. (GAO/NSAID -
99-53) Individuals with moral waivers are expected to be 
more likely to attrite from the DEP. Typically, behavior 
warranting a moral waiver is not consistent with the 
military lifestyle. This "mismatch" may result in DEP 
attrition. 
Differences in moral waiver regulations across 
services require that these differences be controlled in 
all-service models. Therefore, in models 1 and 2, separate 
dummy variables (ARMY, MARINE and AIRFORCE) are entered for 
each branch. NAVY is the omitted category. Since policies 
may change over time, and accessions are normally counted 
within fiscal years, dummy variables are used to control 
for each fiscal year. Fiscal year dummies also capture any 
cohort effects that may be present in the data. 
Specifically, the following dummy variables represent an 
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individual's fiscal year (FY) of DEP entry: FY91, FY92, 
FY93, FY94, FY95, or FY96. Fiscal year 1991 is omitted 
from the model, as the base-case year. 
A county level unemployment rate, (UR2), was assigned 
to each DEP participant based upon the month and year of 
DEP entry and the individual's home of record county. The 
assumption is that individuals who enlist in the military 
initially choose it over their civilian employment 
alternatives. While serving in the DEP at home, however, 
they may seek and find better civilian jobs and thus 
experience "decision reversal." The county is assumed to 
be the relevant local labor market where job search occurs. 
This assumption is less tenable in major metropolitan areas 
where job seekers may search over several nearby urban 
counties. Counties with lower unemployment rates are 
expected to experience more decision reversals, because 
individuals who continue their job search have a higher 
probability of finding a better civilian job. 
In summary, based on previous research, the following 
variables are predicted to have a positive effect on DEP 
attrition (that is, increase an individual's likelihood to 
become a DEP loss): FEMALE, MNS_DEP, AGE_DEP, LOWQUAL, 
GED_NHSG, HSSENIOR, and MORALWVR. The following variables 
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are predicted to have a negative effect on DEP attrition 
(that is, decrease an individual's likelihood to become a 
DEP loss): BLACK, HISP, APIO, UR2, and DEPEND. 
C. J:SSUES WJ:TH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE DATA 
The BLS unemployment rate data files were missing 
information on some counties for some months, which reduced 
the number of observations for estimate of the multivariate 
models. A second problem is that numerous county codes 
were missing in the DMDC data set, and county codes were 
used to merge the two data sets. In model l, the all-
services model that excluded local area unemployment rate, 
there were 39,400 missing observations for various reasons. 
When the same all-services model was estimated with local 
area unemployment rates (model 2), there were 135,194 
missing observations (about 10.3 percent of the total 
sample) . To determine whether the additional missing 
observations were random, and whether the available 
analysis data file was representative of the population, 
the means the variables used in models 1 and 2 were 
compared. This comparison is shown in Table 4.3. 
As seen in Table 4.3, the means in model 1 and model 2 
are nearly identical. By omitting local area unemployment 
rate from the model specification, the model risked an 
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omitted variable bias due to the importance of economic 
factors to an individual's decision. By including 
unemployment data, the model loses approximately 14 percent 
of its observations. Considering that the data set 
contains over 1 million observations, and the additional 
missing observations are representative of the whole 
sample, all models in this thesis include the local area 
unemployment variable. 
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Table 4.3 Variable Means for Models 1 and 2 
Variable N1 N2 Mean1 Mean2 StdDev1 StdDev2 
FEMALE 1100874 1001701 0.171 0.171 0.376 0.377 
BLACK 1100874 1001701 0.171 0.174 0.376 0.379 
HISP 1100161 1001054 0.084 0.081 0.277 0.273 
APIO 1100161 1001054 0.047 0.047 0.212 0.212 
ARMY 1100874 1001701 0.341 0.340 0.474 0.474 
MARINE 1100874 1001701 0.188 0.188 0.391 0.390 
AIRFORCE 1100874 1001701 0.171 0.171 0.377 0.376 
DEPEND 1100874 1001701 0.100 0.101 0.300 0.302 
AGE_DEP 1100874 1001701 19.242 19.219 2.263 2.243 
MNS_DEP 1087543 989575 6.072 6.061 4.083 4.079 
HSSENIOR 1100874 1001701 0.227 0.230 0.419 0.421 
GED_NHSG 1100874 1001701 0.067 0.067 0.250 0.250 
LOWQUAL 1073422 976584 0.286 0.287 0.452 0.452 
MORALWVR 1100874 1001701 0.108 0.108 0.310 0.311 
FY92 1100874 1001701 0.179 0.180 0.384 0.384 
FY93 1100874 1001701 0.177 0.178 0.382 0.383 
FY94 1100874 1001701 0.164 0.164 0.370 0.370 
FY95 1100874 1001701 0.168 0.166 0.374 0.372 
FY96 1100874 1001701 0.121 0.121 0.327 0.326 
UR2 
-----------
1001701 -------- 6.793 -------- 2.991 
ALLDROP 1100874 1001701 0.150 0.151 0.357 0.358 
DEPDROP 1100874 1001701 0.136 0.137 0.343 0.344 
REENTER 1100874 1001701 0.014 0.014 0.117 0.117 
Source: Derived from a special database provided by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center. 
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D. SPECIFICATION OF BASIC MODEL 
The basic model was specified as follows: 
ALLDROP = Bo + Bi (FEMALE) + B2 (BLACK) + B3 (HISP) · 
+ B4(APIO) + Bs(DEPEND) + B5(AGE_DEP) + B7CMNS_DEP) 
+ Bs (HSSENIOR) + B9 (GED_NHSG) + Bio (LOWQUAL) + Bn (MORALWVR) 
+ Bi2(FY92) + B13(FY93) + Bi4(FY94) +Bis(FY95) + Bi5(FY96) + B17(UR2) 
+ Bis (ARMY) + ~i9 (MARINE)+ ~20 (AIRFORCE) ; 
where all variables were defined above in Table 4.2. 
E. :INTERPRETING MODEL RESULTS 
Model results provide estimates of the coefficients 
(B's) called parameter estimates. Each parameter estimate 
has an accompanying standard error. The significance is 
determined by evaluating the chi-square value. ·An asterisk 
on each table indicates variables that are statistically 
significant and the level of significance. 
The results of the logit model provide useful 
information on the relationship between various demographic 
and economic factors and the probability that an individual 
drops out of the DEP. The estimated coefficients (B's) from 
the multivariate mode can be used to compute marginal 
effects. The marginal effect of each independent variable 
49 
quantifies the magnitude of the effect of that variable on 
the probability of DEP attrition. For example, a legit 
marginal effect of .14 associated with the binary variable 
BLACK would indicate that a black recruit was 14 percentage 
points more likely than the base-case individual to become 
a DEP loss. The base-case individual is used to develop 
the baseline probability of attrition. The base-case is 
defined as a single, white man of average age in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Description of the Base-Case Individual 
Variable Description 
Service Navy (for all service models) 
Gender Male 
Dependent Status No dependents 
Race White 
AFQT Score Category I, II or lllA 
Waiver Status No DEP or active duty waivers 
DEP Entry Year Fiscal Year 1991 
Education Level High School Graduate 
DEP Entry Age Average for model sample; 
Varies with each model 
Contract months in DEP Average for model sample; 
Varies with each model 
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V. LOGIT MODEL RESULTS 
A. ALL-SERVICE MODEL WITHOUT UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (MODEL 1) 
Results of model 1 are shown in Table 5.1. Each of the 
variables in the all-service model (model 1) proved to be 
significant at the .01 level. The variables included here 
were selected based solely upon previous research. The 
largest partial effect is produced by the variables 
HSSENIOR. A high school senior is 133 percent more likely 
to become a DEP loss than the base-case individual. The 
MORALWVR variable produced an unexpected sign. A person 
entering the DEP with a moral waiver is 4.2 percentage 
points less likely to become a DEP loss. The next largest 
parameter estimate is for AIRFORCE enlistees. An airman in 
the DEP is 6 percentage points less likely to attrite from 
the DEP than the omitted, base-case (Navy). Translated 
into a percentage, an airman is 58 percent less likely to 
attrite from the DEP than is a sailor. 
The variable FEMALE produced a high marginal effect. A 
female with the same characteristics are the base-case 
individual is 8.5 percentage points more likely to become a 
·DEP loss (which is 83 percent more likely to drop from the 
DEP) . There also appears to be either a trend in DEP 
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Table 5.1 All-Service DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 

















































Chi-square= 84,355 (d.f.=19) (p=.0001) 
*Significant at the .01 level 































































attrition or significant cohort effects, as the negative 
coefficients for fiscal years 1995 and 1996 are much larger 
than for earlier years. 
B. ALL-SERVICE MODEL WITH COUNTY-LEVEL ONEMPOYMENT RATES 
(MODEL 2) 
The results of estimating the all-service model with 
the unemployment rates are displayed in Table 5.2. Only 
HISP,and FY93 proved to be insignificant at the .01 level. 
As in model 1, the largest marginal effect was produced by 
the variable HSSENIOR. A high school senior is 13.2 
percentage points more likely to attrite from the DEP. In 
other terms, this person is 128 percent more likely to 
become a DEP drop. Separate models for high school seniors 
and non-high school seniors were used based upon the 
results of likelihood ratio tests. (see Appendix) The 
variable MORALWVR produced an unexpected sign. An 
individual with a moral waiver is 41 percent less likely to 
attrite from the DEP. When the county unemployment rate 
increases by 1 percentage point, (a 15-percent change), the 
probability of DEP loss increases by 10 percent. This 
yields an elasticity of DEP loss with respect to the 
unemployment rate of -.66. As noted previously, the number 
of missing observations increased significantly in model 2 
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compared with model 1. 
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Table 5.2 All-Service DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
With County-level Unemployment Rates 
(Model 2) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Variable Estimate Error Effect Effect 
=(AP/~} ={AP/~+P} 
INTERCPT -5.443 0.037 
FEMALE 0.713 * 0.008 0.087 0.843 
BLACK -0.103 * 0.009 -0.009 -0.089 
HISP -0.016 0.012 -0.001 -0.014 
APIO -0.090 * 0.015 -0.008 -0.078 
DEPEND -0.282 * 0.012 -0.023 -0.227 
AGE_DEP 0.126 * 0.002 0.012 0.118 
MNS_DEP 0.156 * 0.001 0.015 0.149 
HSSENIOR 0.983 * 0.008 0.132 1.280 
GED_NHSG 0.414 * 0.013 0.045 0.437 
LOWQUAL 0.058 * 0.007 0.005 0.053 
MORALWVR -0.580 * 0.012 -0.043 -0.414 
FY92 -0.091 * 0.010 -0.008 -0.079 
FY93 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.001 
FY94 0.032 * 0.010 0.003 0.029 
FY95 -0.102 * 0.010 -0.009 -0.088 
FY96 -0.385 * 0.013 -0.031 -0.296 
UR2 -0.012 * 0.001 -0.001 -0.010 
ARMY 0.101 * 0.008 0.010 0.094 
MARINE 0.194 * 0.009 0.019 0.188 
AIRFORCE -0.938 * 0.011 -0.060 -0.583 
N=965,701 
-2 Log L = 708,167 
Chi-square= 76,471 (d.f.=19) (p=.0001) 
*Significant at the .01 level 
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C. SERVICE-SPECIFIC LOGIT MODELS {MODELS 3-6) 
Tables 5.5 through 5.8 show the results of individual 
service DEP attrition LOGIT models (Models 3-6) . A summary 
of marginal effects for all individual services is shown in 
Table 5.9. Most variables in all models are significant at 
the .05 level or greater. A few variables produced 
unexpected signs in models 5-8. As in models 1 and 2, 
MORALWVR produced an unexpected negative sign. An 
individual who enters the DEP with a moral waiver or who 
attains a moral waiver while in the DEP is 2 to 9 
percentage points less likely to drop out of the DEP. 
Prior research findings have found both positive and 
negative effects associated with waiver variables. 
(Henderson, 1999) The marginal effect for MORALWVR is 
highest in the Marine Corps model, nearly five times 
greater than that of the Army model. An individual in the 
Marine Corps DEP with a moral waiver is 63 percent less 
likely to attrite from the DEP than is someone in the 
Marine Corps DEP without a moral ·waiver. This is counter-
intuitive. Of all the services, the Marine Corps has the 
highest proportion of individuals who enter the DEP with a 
moral waiver. Perhaps this is due to the service's strict 
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requirements concerning the types of offenses that require 
a moral waiver. 
The variable HISP produced an unexpected positive sign 
in the Navy model; however, HISP was insignificant. The 
variable APIO produced an unexpected positive sign in the 
Marine Corps model at a .05 significance level. This 
indicates that Navy Hispanics are generally more likely to 
attrite from the DEP. Hispanics in the Marine Corps DEP 
are .5 percentage points less likely to attrite from the 
DEP. The marginal effects of both APIO and HISP are 
relatively small. Therefore, a sign change is not too 
surprising. 
Marine Corps women are 10.5 percentage points more 
likely to attrite from DEP than are Marine Corps men. This 
is the largest marginal effect for gender among the 
services. Women in the Army experience the smallest 
marginal effect, at 6.7 percentage points. This finding is 
consistent with prior research. (Philip and Schmitz, 
1985; Quester and Murray, 1986; Nakada, 1994; Bohn and 
Schmitz, 1996; and Henderson, 1999) 
DEPEND produced expected results across services. An 
individual who enters the DEP with a dependent is 1 to 3 
percentage points less likely to attrite from the DEP. 
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This finding is consistent with prior research. 
Nelson, 1992; Henderson, 1999) 
(Kearl and 
The variable LOWQUAL has an inconsistent impact upon 
an individual's likelihood to attrite from the DEP across 
all services. This variable is significant only for the 
Army and Navy models. For the Army model, an individual 
who scores below the 64th percentile on the AFQT is 19 
percent more likely to attrite from the DEP. The same 
individual in the Navy DEP is only 8 percent more likely to 
attrite from the DEP. This finding concurs with some prior 
research. (Murray, 1985; Philip and Schmitz, 1985; Bohn 
and Schmitz, 1996; Knox, 1998; and Henderson, 1999) 
However, it contradicts findings in another study. 
(Nakada, 1994) 
The amount of time contracted to spend in the DEP 
proved to be significant across all services. Moreover, 
the marginal effect· of this variable is relatively constant 
for all models. Each additional month contracted to spend 
in the DEP increases the likelihood that an individual will 
attrite from the DEP by approximately 1.5 percentage 
points. This finding is consistent with prior research. 
(Philip and Schmitz, 1985; Murray, 1985; Quester and 
Murray, 1986; Kearl and Nelson, 1990; Nakada, 1994; Bohn 
and Schmitz, 1996; Knox, 1998; and Henderson, 1999) 
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Education level variables, GED_NHSG and HSSENIOR, were 
significant in models 1 through 6. Both GED_NHSG and 
HSSENIOR had the largest percentage effects in the Marine 
Corps model. Specifically, a high school senior in the 
Marine Corps DEP is 122 percent more likely to attrite from 
the DEP than a Marine Corps high school graduate. This 
finding is consistent with prior research. (Murray, 1985; 
and Knox, 1998) 
The variable AGE_DEP has a positive effect on DEP 
attrition across services. Individuals who are one year 
older than average (base-case) are 1 to 2 percentage points 
more likely to attrite from the DEP. This finding is 
consistent with prior research. (Murray, 1985; Nakada, 
1994; Bohn and Schmitz, 1996; and Henderson, 1999) 
The variables that control for differences in DEP 
behavior between fiscal years indicate a slight upward 
trend in DEP attrition. Individuals who entered the Army 
DEP in fiscal year 1996 are 2.3 percentage points less 
likely to attrite from DEP that those who entered in 1991; 
whereas individuals who entered the DEP in 1992 through 
1994 are only .3 to 1.4 percentage points more likely to 
attrite from the DEP. This trend also appears in the Air 
Force model. In the Navy model 1992 through 1994 variables 
are not significant, but the DEP attrition rate is 2.5 
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point higher in 1996. The Marine Corps model indicates 
that DEP attrition increases until 1995, but there is no 
difference in 1996. 
The county-level unemployment variable proved to be 
significant across all services. When the county-level 
unemployment rate increases by 1 percentage, the 
probability of DEP loss increases by .1 percentage point. 
Although the impact of county-level unemployment is 
relatively small, the results are consistent with findings 
of prior research. (Kearl and Nelson, 1994; and Henderson, 
1999) 
Note that the unemployment rate is measured as of the 
individual's month of entry into the DEP. No attempt is 
made to examine DEP stay-loss decisions longitudinally. 
Since civilian unemployment is known to be an important 
factor in motivating a person to enlist, it is likely that 
the coefficient of the unemployment rate is biased 
downward. An analysis of month-to-month changes in local 
unemployment rates on DEP participants' stay-leave 
decisions would provide a more accurate indicator of the 
strength of unemployment on DEP loss decisions. 
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Table 5.3 Army DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
(Model 3) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 





FEMALE 0.7223 * 0.0131 0.067 0.911 
BLACK -0.0323 ** 0.0144 -0.002 -0.029 
HISP 
-0.0087 0.0234 -0.001 -0.008 
APIO 
-0.1208 * 0.0296 -0.008 -0.106 
DEPEND 
-0.3335 * 0.0197 -0.020 -0.268 
AGE_DEP 0.1528 * 0.0028 0.011 0.151 
MNS_DEP 0.2066 * 0.0021 0.015 0.209 
HSSENIOR 1.1435 * 0.0146 0.126 1.712 
GED_NHSG 0.3712 * 0.0207 0.030 0.403 
LOWQUAL 0.1897 * 0.0136 0.014 0.191 
MORALWVR -0.2913 * 0.0292 -0.018 -0.239 
FY92 0.0052 0.0187 0.000 0.005 
FY93 0.0440 * 0.0180 0.003 0.042 
FY94 0.1849 * 0.0183 0.014 0.185 
FY95 
-0.0473 * 0.0184 -0.003 -0.043 
FY96 
-0.4060 * 0.0235 -0.023 -0.317 
UR2 
-0.0053 * 0.0020 -0.000 -0.005 
N=327,104 
-2 Log L = 219, 124 
Chi-square= 33,939 (d.f.=17) (p=.0001) 
* Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
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Table 5.4 Navy DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
(Model 4) 
Variable Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Estimate Error Effect Effect 
=(LiP/LiX) =(LiP/LiX 
+P 
INTECEPT -5.5700 0.0645 
FEMALE 0.7470 * 0.0137 0.087 0.907 
BLACK -0.0678 * 0.0152 -0.006 -0.060 
HISP 0.0125 0.0189 0.001 0.011 
APIO -0.1523 * 0.0277 -0.012 -0.129 
DEPEND -0.1201 * 0.0224 -0.010 -0.103 
AGE_DEP 0.1338 * 0.0029 0.012 0.128 
MNS_DEP 0.1598 * 0.0019 0.015 0.154 
HSSENIOR 0.7558 * 0.0138 0.088 0.921 
GED_NHSG 0.3958 * 0.0223 0.039 0.407 
LOWQUAL 0.0836 * 0.0123 0.007 0.078 
MORALWVR -0.3588 * 0.0172 -0.027 -0.281 
FY92 -0.0294 0.0166 -0.003 -0.026 
FY93 -0.0284 0.0177 -0.002 -0.025 
FY94 -0.0094 0.0186 -0.001 -0.008 
FY95 -0.0478 ** 0.0190 -0.004 -0.042 
FY96 -0.3301 * 0.0250 -0.025 -0.261 
UR2 -0.0162 * 0.0020 -0.001 -0.015 
N=293,176 
-2 Log L = 219,631 
Chi-square= 19,687 (d.f.17) (p=.0001) 
* Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
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Table 5.5 Marine Corps DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
(Model 5) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Variable Estimate Error Effect Effect 
={AP/AX} {AP/L\X +P} 
INTECEPT 
-5.309 0.097 
FEMALE o.6n * 0.023 0.105 0.727 
BLACK 
-0.135 * 0.020 -0.016 -0.110 
HISP 
-0.043 ** 0.022 -0.005 -0.036 
APIO 0.056 ** 0.027 0.007 0.049 
DEPEND 
-0.218 * 0.033 -0.025 -0.172 
AGE_DEP 0.152 * 0.005 0.019 0.135 
MNS_DEP 0.120 * 0.002 0.015 0.107 
HSSENIOR 1.029 * 0.016 0.176 1.224 
GED_NHSG 0.660 * 0.030 0.101 0.706 
.LOWQUAL 
-0.022 0.014 -0.003 -0.019 
MORALWVR -1.101 * 0.024 -0.091 -0.632 
FY92 
-0.299 * 0.022 -0.033 -0.230 
FY93 
-0.153 * 0.021 -0.018 -0.124 
FY94 
-0.137 * 0.021 -0.016 -0.112 
FY95 
-0.233 * 0.022 -0.026 -0.183 
FY96 
-0.319 * 0.026 -0.035 -0.244 
UR2 
-0.009 * 0.002 -0.001 -0.007 
N=180,866 
-2 Log L = 153,521 
Chi-square = 15,883 (d.f.=17) (p=.0001) 
*Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
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Table 5.6 Air Force DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
(Model 6) 
Variable Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Estimate Error Effect Effect 
={AP/AX} {AP/AX+P} 
INTECEPT -4.795 0.102 
FEMALE* 0.729 * 0.017 0.082 0.889 
BLACK* -0.356 * 0.025 -0.026 -0.280 
HISP** -0.074 ** 0.038 -0.006 -0.065 
APIO* -0.180 * 0.041 -0.014 -0.152 
DEPEND* -0.412 * 0.030 -0.029 -0.316 
AGE_DEP* 0.056 * 0.004 0.005 0.052 
MNS_DEP* 0.146 * 0.004 0.013 0.141 
HSSENIOR* 1.134 * 0.020 0.148 1.601 
GED_NHSG* 0.326 * 0.045 0.031 0.338 
LOWQUAL 0.003 0.021 0.000 0.002 
MORALWVR* -0.771 * 0.049 -0.047 -0.513 
FY92* -0.142 * 0.026 -0.011 -0.121 
FY93* 0.080 * 0.025 0.007 0.075 
FY94** -0.059 ** 0.025 -0.005 -0.052 
FY95* -0.332 * 0.027 -0.024 -0.263 
FY96* -0.799 * 0.036 -0.049 -0.526 
UR2* -0.019 * 0.003 -0.002 -0.017 
N=164,555 
Missing Observations=24,239 
-2 Log L =111, 171.950 
Chi-square = 9,336.528 with 17 degrees of freedom (p=.0001) 
* Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
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Table 5.7 Summary of Marginal Effects for DEP Attrition 
LOGIT Models for All Services {Models 3-6) 
Army Navy Marine Air 
Corps Force 
Variable (Model 3} {Model 4} {Model 5} (Model 6} 
FEMALE 0.067 * 0.087 * 0.105 * 0.082 * 
BLACK -0.002 ** -0.006 * -0.016 * -0.026 * 
HISP -0.001 0.001 -0.005 ** -0.006 ** 
APIO -0.008 * -0.012 * 0.007 ** -0.014 * 
DEPEND -0.020 * -0.010 * -0.025 * -0.029 * 
AGE_DEP 0.011 * 0.012 * 0.019 * 0.005 * 
MNS_DEP 0.015 * 0.015 * 0.015 * 0.013 * 
HSSENIOR 0.126 * 0.088 * o.176 * 0.148 * 
GED_NHSG 0.030 * 0.039 * 0.101 * 0.031 * 
LOWQUAL 0.014 * 0.007 * -0.003 0.000 
MORALWVR -0.018 * -0.027 * -0.091 * -0.047 * 
FY92 0.000 -0.003 -0.033 * -0.011 * 
FY93 0.003 * -0.002 -0.018 * 0.007 * 
FY94 0.014 * -0.001 -0.016 * -0.005 ** 
FY95 -0.003 * -0.004 ** -0.026 * -0.024 * 
FY96 -0.023 * -0.025 * -0.035 * -0.049 * 
UR2 -0.000 * -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.002 * 
*Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
65 
66 
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Several findings emerged from the study of DEP 
attrition. Major results of statistical analyses include 
the following: 
• Gender and educational level were found to have a strong 
effect on the attrition behavior of individuals in the 
DEP. Specifically, recruits who are high school seniors 
tend to have the highest DEP attrition rates. Further, a 
likelihood ratio test was used to determine that separate 
models are required for high school seniors and non-high 
school seniors. 
• Women tend to be 6 to 10 percentage points more likely 
than are men to leave the DEP. 
• Across services, the Marine Corps experiences the highest 
DEP attrition rates for both men and women. 
• County-level unemployment rates had a significant, but 
small, negative effect on DEP attrition. That is, an 
increase in the unemployment rate results in a decrease 
in the DEP attrition rate. 
• The longer a person spends in the DEP, the more likely he 
or she will leave the DEP prior to basic training. 
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• Recruits who have dependents at the time of DEP entry are 
less likely than those who do not have dependents to 
leave the DEP. 
• Across services, participants who are black tend to be 
less likely to leave the DEP. 
• Persons whose ethnic origin is Asian or Pacific Islander 
are less likely to attrite from the DEP, except for those 
in the Marine Corps. 
• Hispanic ethnicity was found to have a negative impact on 
DEP attrition in the Marine Corps and Air Force. That 
is, a Hispanic recruit in the Marine Corps or Air Force 
DEP is less likely to leave than is a non-Hispanic 
recruit. 
• Across services, individuals with a moral waiver tend to 
be less likely to attrite from the DEP than are those 
without a moral waiver. 
• Most individuals who leave the DEP (32 to 55 percent), do 
so for "apathy, personal problems or refusal to enlist" 
(official categories in DEP documentation). 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
Most of the findings in this study concur with those of 
prior research. For example, as in previous studies of DEP 
attrition, women were found to leave the DEP at rates much 
higher than those of men. About 50 percent of women drop 
out of the DEP for the stated reasons of "apathy, personal 
problems, or refusal to enlist." According to the Youth 
Attitude Tracking Study in 1992, women also have a much 
lower propensity to enlist than do men. (Perry, 1996) 
Perhaps, women who enter the DEP are less sure of their 
decision to enlist, and therefore less likely to remain in 
the DEP. Additionally, 12 to 14 percent of women leave the 
DEP because of pregnancy. 
As previously noted, high school seniors attrite from 
the DEP at rates that are much higher than those of non-
high school seniors. While finishing high school, high 
school seniors may decide against military service as other 
employment opportunities become available. Also, 
opportunities to pursue higher education may arise while 
high school seniors wait in the DEP. Further, the longer 
high school seniors spend in the DEP, the greater the 
chance that other individuals may influence their decision 
to leave the DEP. 
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On average, individuals spend about 6 months in the 
DEP. Many previous studies have determined that the longer 
an individual spends in the DEP, the more likely he or she 
is to drop out. Each service has different DEP management 
policies regarding contact requirements between DEP 
participants and recruiters. Despite differing policies, 
the effect of time in DEP remains nearly constant across 
services. For example, although Army recruiters increase 
their contact with DEP participants 45 days before they 
ship to boot camp, the Army still experiences DEP attrition 
rates that are roughly similar to those of other services. 
Previous studies have found significant, negative 
effects of unemployment rates on DEP attrition. Most 
researchers would agree that unemployment rates at the time 
of DEP entry are· a likely influence on decisions to join 
the military. The present study used county-level 
unemployment data that were not specifically tied to 
periods of DEP departure. A more accurate determinant of 
DEP attrition may be unemployment rates at the time that an 
individual drops out of the DEP. Previous studies have 
used regional unemployment rates. (Kearl and Nelson, 1990; 
and Henderson, 1999) As previously noted, this study used 
county-level unemployment rates in DEP attrition models. 
If youth seek employment outside their own county when 
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considering employment opportunities, perhaps metropolitan-
area or regional unemployment rates may be a more accurate 
determinant of DEP attrition. 
One of the results in the present study differs from 
that of previous research. Across services, individuals 
with either a DEP moral wavier or an active-duty moral 
waiver were found to be less likely to leave the DEP. 
These results are consistent with Henderson's research; 
however, it should be noted that she used the same database 
and only studied high school seniors. (Henderson, 1999) 
Nevertheless, the results regarding moral waivers are 
counter-intuitive, since first-term attrition for recruits 
who have a moral waiver is typically much higher than for 
others. (Flyer, 1995; and Flyer, 1996) If persons with a 
moral waiver are so consistently more likely to leave 
during their first term of active-duty service, it should 
follow that they are also more likely than others to leave 
the DEP. 
One explanation for this unexpected result regarding 
moral waivers may be corruption of the data. The Marine 
Corps has yet another explanation for this unexpected 
result. The Marine Corps generally screens individuals 
requiring a moral waiver for enlistment more closely than 
it screens other applicants. A moral waiver package must 
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be prepared for each case. This package includes 
significant documentation, including personal letters of 
referral. Any individual who applies for enlistment, but 
is required to have a moral waiver, must usually exhibit 
other positive, compensating qualifications, which are 
documented in the waiver package. If enough qualified 
individuals seek enlistment, Marine Corps recruiters have 
leeway to be more restrictive when considering individuals 
who need a moral waiver. According to authorities in the 
Marine Corps, since DEP enrollees with a moral waiver are 
required to demonstrate that they are highly qualified in 
other ways, their relatively stronger qualifications may 
make them less likely to leave the DEP. 
As previously noted, the present study found that a 
majority of persons who leave the DEP do so for the stated 
reasons of "apathy, personal problems, or refusal to 
enlist." It is clear that these reasons are hardly 
descriptive enough to allow for detailed research regarding 
the causes of attrition. After all, what is actually meant 
by "refusal to enlist"? Why, precisely, did the individual 
refuse to enlist? The DEP discharge codes in the official 
documentation are too vague and may not accurately indicate 
the true reason why a recruit leaves the DEP. Currently, 
the form that captures this reason allows for the selection 
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of only one coded entry. In reality, a person may leave 
the DEP for a variety of reasons; yet, recruiting personnel 
are limited to assign a single reason for a DEP loss. 
Additionally, an individual who simply does not want to go 
to boot camp may be classified differently by each service. 
The Army may classify this individual as having_ a "personal 
problem," whereas the Marine Corps may classify this 
individual simply as "refused active service." 
C. RECOMMENDAT:CONS 
The stated reasons why individuals leave the DEP, as 
provided in official forms, are too vague for proper 
analyses. As noted, administrative forms only allow for 
entry of a single reason as to why an individual drops out. 
New administrative forms that capture multiple drop codes 
could provide for improved analyses of the reasons for DEP 
attrition. Furthermore, recruiters may be reluctant to 
show a drop category that places blame for a DEP loss on 
the recruiter as opposed to the DEP participant. If a 
recruit leaves for "apathy," the recruiting command may 
view this as a leadership failure of the recruiter. One 
way to capture the true reason why an individual leaves the 
DEP is to conduct a personal, exit interview as soon as 
possible with the person after he or she drops out. 
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High school seniors have a very high rate of DEP 
attrition; however, it is difficult to deal with this 
situation until one can determine more accurately the 
reasons as to why seniors are leaving the DEP. Limiting 
enlistments by high school seniors may reduce DEP 
attrition, but such action would obviously affect the 
ability of recruiters to meet their recruiting goals. 
Apparently, a number of high school seniors are forced to 
leave the DEP for failure to graduate from high school. A 
greater effort to help high school seniors successfully 
complete high school may assist in reducing DEP attrition. 
For example, high school seniors with marginal grades could 
be paired with fellow DEP participants who have academic 
strengths. This teamwork could create a sense of belonging 
for all DEP participants, as well as provide the extra help 
that some seniors need to graduate. 
Perhaps, an individual leaving the DEP bases his or 
her decision on varying conditions of unemployment in the 
civilian sector. Future studies could include a variable 
representing an unemployment rate trend, that is, whether 
unemployment rates are increasing or decreasing over time. 
Additionally, individuals may be lured away from the DEP by 
employment opportunities throughout their metropolitan 
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area. Future studies should explore the effects of 
metropolitan-level unemployment rates on DEP attrition. 
The negative effects of moral waivers on DEP attrition, 
in the present study, are unexpected and conflict with any 
logical explanation. The effects of this variable should 
be studied in more detail using alternative data sources. 
Special attention must be given to the needs of female 
DEP members. More female role models in the recruiting 
force may provide the guiding leadership necessary to 
reduce the attrition of women from the DEP. Additionally, 
providing limited military medical services, such as birth 
control, for female DEP members may help to reduce DEP 
attrition by a number of young women. 
To make recruiting efforts more effective, military 
leaders must convey a heightened sense of awareness among 
individual recruiters regarding groups that are prone to 
leave the DEP. Recruiters could then focus more attention 
on groups that have a higher risk of attrition to maintain 
a solid pool of qualified individuals for military service. 
Further studies to better determine why these groups leave 
the DEP at higher rates would be the key to future analysis 
of DEP attrition behavior. 
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APPENDIX. HIGH SCHOOL SENIOR AND NON-HIGH SCHOOL 
SENIOR MODELS 
Previous studies used separate models for high school 
seniors and non-high school seniors. (Kearl and Nelson, 
1992 and Henderson, 1999) In order to determine if 
separate models were necessary in this thesis, a likelihood 
ratio test was conducted to compare the estimated 
coefficients from each of three models: one estimated for 
high school seniors, one for non-high school seniors and 
one for the entire group (pooled) . The test statistic for 
the likelihood ratio test is: 
A = 2 [Log UR - Log R] 
where R=restricted model 
U=unrestricted model 
The difference is distributed chi-square at a .05 
significance level. The test statistic is 18,507, which 
rejects the null hypothesis of identical coefficients for 
the two groups. This suggests that separate models should 
be estimated for the two groups. 
Model Al and A2 estimate separate models for high 
school seniors and non-high school seniors for all-
services. Table 7.1 shows the results of the all-service 
model (model Al) with high school seniors only. Table 7.2 
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shows the results of the all-service model (model A2) with 
non-high school seniors. 
In both models Al and A2, all variables were 
significant at the .05 level or greater. Three variables 
produced unexpected signs in model Al: HISP, APIO, and 
MORALWVR. Being Hispanic or Asian Pacific Islander has an 
opposite effect for high school seniors. Previous studies 
hypothesized that older high school seniors are more likely 
to attrite from DEP. (Kearl and Nelson, 1992) This holds 
true in model Al. Here the variable AGE_DEP shows that a 
one-year increase in age increases the DEP attrition 
likelihood by 12 percent. This age effect appears to be 
equal for non-high school seniors. High school seniors 
appear to be equally affected by the local area 
unemployment rates as non-high school seniors. In both 
models, a one-percent increase in the unemployment rate 
decreases the DEP attrition likelihood by about 1 percent. 
For high school seniors, females are 16 percentage points 
more likely to attrite from DEP vice 8 percentage points 
for non-high school seniors. 
The only variable to produce an unexpected sign in 
both models Al and A2 was MORALWVR. The service variable 
AIRFORCE produced the largest parameter estimate for model 
A2. Among non-high school seniors, an individual in the 
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Air Force DEP is 7.7 percentage points more likely to 
become a DEP drop than an individual in the Navy DEP. The 
variable LOWQUAL produces a marginal effect about one-
eighth the size of LOWQUAL for the high school seniors. If 
a high school senior scores low on the AFQT, perhaps they 
may also have difficulty graduating from high school. 
Failure to graduate from high school is a common reason 
that some high school seniors drop from DEP. The signs of 
the ARMY variable are different in models Al and A2. For 
high school seniors, ARMY has a positive effect on DEP 
attrition, increasing the likelihood of a DEP drop by 7.7 
percent. For non-high school seniors, ARMY has a negative 
effect on DEP attrition, decreasing the likelihood of a DEP 
drop by .8 percent. 
Likelihood ratio tests confirmed the necessity of 
modeling high school seniors and non-high school seniors 
separately in each of the four individual service models. 
Tables 7.3 through 7.10 shows the results of modeling for 
each separate service, by high school seniors and non-high 
school seniors. 
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Table 7.1 All-Service DEP Attrition LOGIT Model, 
High school seniors only 
{Model A1) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Variable Estimate Error Effect Effect 
={AP/AX) ={AP/AX +P} 
INTERCEPT -5.257 0.129 
FEMALE 0.812 * 0.014 0.164 0.786 
BLACK -0.080 * 0.014 -0.013 -0.062 
HISP 0.056 * 0.018 0.009 0.045 
APIO 0.060 ** 0.025 0.010 0.048 
DEPEND -0.173 * 0.039 -0.027 -0.130 
AGE_DEP 0.154 * 0.007 0.027 0.128 
MNS_DEP 0.171 * 0.002 0.030 0.142 
LOWQUAL 0.094 * 0.011 0.016 0.076 
MORALWVR -0.793 * 0.023 -0.102 -0.489 
FY92 -0.176 * 0.017 -0.028 -0.132 
FY93 -0.034 ** 0.016 -0.005 -0.026 
FY94 -0.053 * 0.017 -0.009 -0.041 
FY95 -0.128 * 0.017 -0.020 -0.097 
FY96 -0.065 * 0.021 -0.011 -0.050 
UR2 -0.012 * 0.002 -0.002 -0.009 
ARMY 0.419 * 0.013 0.077 0.371 
MARINE 0.273 * 0.013 0.049 0.233 
AIRFORCE -0.632 * 0.018 -0.086 -0.411 
N=221,125 
-2 Log L =246,237 
Chi-square= 12,691 (d.f.=18) (p=.0001) 
*Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
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Table 7 .2 All-Service DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
Non-high school seniors only 
(Model A2) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Variable Estimate Error Effect Effect 
·········-·-····---··----··-···-·········-·-· -···--····----·······-·······-·-····--···---·--·-··=~p I Li?.5.L ___ _::~P Z~ . .:::E2.. 
INTERCEPT -5.487 
FEMALE 0.666 * 
BLACK -0.124 * 
HISP -0.068 * 
APIO -0.186 * 
DEPEND -0.271 * 
AGE_DEP 0.136 * 
MNS_DEP 0.156 * 
LOWQUAL 0.021 ** 
MORALWV -0.509 * 
FY92 -0.034 * 
FY93 0.037 * 
FY94 0.103 * 
FY95* -0.073 * 
FY96* -0.627 * 
UR2* -0.012 * 
ARMY* -0.078 * 
MARINE* 0.162 * 
AIRFORCE* -1.148 * 
N=744,576 
-2 Log L =460, 159 
Chi-square = 25,941 {d.f.=18) (p=.0001) 
* Significant at the .01 level 

























































Table 7.3 Army DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
High school seniors only 
(Model A3) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Variable Estimate Error Effect Effect 
INTERCEPT -7.003 0.252 
FEMALE 0.930 * 0.026 0.217 0.768 
BLACK -0.035 0.027 -0.007 -0.025 
HISP 0.115 * 0.042 0.024 0.085 
APIO -0.085 0.055 -0.017 -0.060 
DEPEND -0.250 * 0.087 -0.048 -0.169 
AGE_DEP 0.243 * 0.014 0.052 0.183 
MNS_DEP 0.236 * 0.004 0.050 0.177 
LOWQUAL 0.149 * 0.026 0.031 0.111 
MORALWVR -0.332 * 0.078 -0.062 -0.220 
FY92 -0.101 * 0.036 -0.020 -0.071 
FY93 -0.041 0.032 -0.008 -0.029 
FY94 -0.080 ** 0.035 -0.016 -0.056 
FY95 -0.178 * 0.033 -0.035 -0.123 
FY96 -0.150 * 0.040 -0.029 -0.104 
UR2 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
N=54101 
-2 Log L=61499 
Chi-square=5067 (d.f.=15) (p=.0001) 
*Significant at the .01 level 
**Significant at the .05 level 
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Table 7.4 Army DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 




Standard Marginal Percentage 



















































Chi-square=10666 (d.f.=15) (p=.0001) 
* Significant at the .01 level 

































Table 7.5 Navy DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 




Standard Marginal Percentage 



















































Chi-square=3460 (d.f.=15) (p=.0001) 
*Significant at the .01 level 
































Table 7.6 Navy DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
Non-High school seniors only 
(Model A6) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Variable Estimate Error Effect Effect 
INTERCEPT -5.505 0.069 
FEMALE 0.728 * 0.017 0.096 0.847 
BLACK -0.140 * 0.020 -0.013 -0.118 
HISP -0.059 ** 0.025 -0.006 -0.051 
APIO -0.197 * 0.034 -0.018 -0.162 
DEPEND -0.103 * 0.024 -0.010 -0.088 
AGE_DEP 0.134 * 0.003 0.014 0.126 
MNS_DEP 0.158 * 0.002 0.017 0.149 
LOWQUAL 0.004 0.016 -0.000 -0.004 
MORALWVR -0.315 * 0.021 -0.028 -0.247 
FY92 0.019 0.021 0.002 0.017 
FY93 -0.043 0.023 -0.004 -0.037 
FY94 0.015 0.024 0.001 0.013 
FY95 -0.018 0.024 -0.002 -0.016 
FY96 -0.525 * 0.033 -0.043 -0.380 
UR2 -0.014 * 0.003 -0.001 -0.013 
N=216701 
-2 Log L=139016 
Chi-square=9228 (d.f.=15) (p=.0001) 
* Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
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Table 7.7 Marine Corps DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
High school seniors only 
(Model A7) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Variable Estimate Error Effect Effect 
INTERCEPT -4.298 0.248 
FEMALE 0.781 * 0.035 0.183 0.612 
BLACK -0.122 * 0.027 -0.025 -0.083 
HISP -0.023 0.030 -0.005 -0.016 
APIO 0.259 * 0.039 0.057 0.190 
DEPEND -0.113 0.071 -0.023 -0.078 
AGE_DEP 0.140 * 0.013 0.030 0.101 
MNS_DEP 0.132 * 0.004 0.028 0.095 
LOWQUAL 0.028 0.019 0.006 0.020 
MORALWVR -1.239 * 0.038 -0.189 -0.632 
FY92 -0.329 * 0.031 -0.064 -0.214 
FY93 -0.159 * 0.030 -0.032 -0.108 
FY94 -0.097 * 0.030 -0.020 -0.067 
FY95 -0.113 * 0.031 -0.023 -0.077 
FY96 0.059 0.036 0.012 0.042 
UR2 0.005 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
N=63994 
-2 Log L= 7 4827 
Chi-square=3045 {d.f.=15) (p=.0001) 
*Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
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Table 7.8 Marine Corps DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
Non-High school seniors only 
(Model AS) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Variable Estimate Error Effect Effect 
INTERCEPT -5.279 0.109 
FEMALE 0.561 * 0.032 0.094 0.555 
BLACK -0.172 * 0.030 -0.023 -0.135 
HISP -0.062 ** 0.031 -0.008 -0.050 
APIO -0.157 * 0.039 -0.021 -0.124 
DEPEND -0.240 * 0.037 -0.031 -0.184 
AGE_DEP 0.160 * 0.005 0.024 0.140 
MNS_DEP 0.116 * 0.003 0.017 0.100 
LOWQUAL -0.082 * 0.021 -0.011 -0.066 
MORALWVR -1.012 * 0.032 -0.100 -0.593 
FY92 -0.248 * 0.031 -0.032 -0.189 
FY93 -0.111 * 0.030 -0.015 -0.089 
FY94 -0.141 * 0.030 -0.019 -0.112 
FY95 -0.320 * 0.032 -0.040 -0.238 
FY96 -0.728 * 0.041 -0.080 -0.471 
UR2 -0.013 * 0.003 -0.002 -0.010 
N=116872 
-2 Log L= 78650 
Chi-square=4060 (d.f.=15) (p=.0001) 
* Significant at the .01 level 
**Significant at the .05 level 
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Table 7.9 Air Force DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
High school seniors only 
(Model A9) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Variable Estimate Error Effect Effect 
INTERCEPT -2.029 0.373 
FEMALE 0.830 * 0.032 0.104 1.028 
BLACK -0.527 * 0.049 -0.039 -0.384 
HISP -0.101 0.075 -0.009 -0.087 
APIO -0.066 0.081 -0.006 -0.057 
DEPEND -0.430 * 0.120 -0.033 -0.326 
AGE_DEP -0.055 * 0.019 -0.005 -0.048 
MNS_DEP 0.180 * 0.011 0.017 0.173 
LOWQUAL 0.060 0.037 0.006 0.055 
MORALWVR -0.776 * 0.107 -0.052 -0.513 
FY92 -0.155 * 0.050 -0.013 -0.131 
FY93 0.043 0.049 0.004 0.040 
FY94 -0.177 * 0.050 -0.015 -0.148 
FY95 -0.440 * 0.053 -0.033 -0.332 
FY96 -0.512 * 0.062 -0.038 -0.376 
UR2 -0.029 * 0.005 -0.003 -0.026 
N=26555 
-2 Log L=27954 
Chi-square=1374 {d.f.=15) (p=.0001) 
*Significant at the .01 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
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Table 7.10 Air Force DEP Attrition LOGIT Model 
Non-High school seniors only 
(Model A10) 
Parameter Standard Marginal Percentage 
Variable Estimate Error Effect Effect 
INTERCEPT :-4.982 0.105 
FEMALE 0.683 * 0.019 0.046 0.884 
BLACK -0.297 * 0.029 -0.013 -0.247 
HISP -0.064 0.044 -0.003 -0.059 
APIO -0.219 * 0.048 -0.010 -0.188 
DEPEND -0.418 * 0.031 -0.017 -0.329 
AGE_DEP 0.069 * 0.004 0.004 0.068 
MNS_DEP 0.140 * 0.004 0.007 0.142 
LOWQUAL -0.021 0.026 -0.001 -0.020 
MORALWVR -0.778 * 0.056 -0.027 -0.527 
FY92 -0.139 * 0.030 -0.006 -0.124 
FY93 0.094 * 0.029 0.005 0.093 
FY94 -0.012 0.030 -0.001 -0.012 
FY95 -0.285 * 0.032 -0.012 -0.238 
FY96 -0.966 * 0.046 -0.031 -0.607 
UR2 -0.015 * 0.003 -0.001 -0.014 
N=138000 
-2 Log L=83092 
Chi-square=3849 (d.f.=15) (p=.0001) 
* Significant at the .01 level 
**Significant at the .05 level 
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